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debt is owed may assert priority claims under § 502(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.5 In order to 
assert such a claim, a creditor must show that the debt arose: (1) during the gap period, and (2) in 
the ordinary course of business.6  
 A creditor’s right to a priority § 502(f) claim is frequently the subject of litigation. This 
memorandum will analyze a few of the hurdles a creditor must clear to ensure repayment. 
Section I analyzes the strict requirement that gap period debt arises in the ordinary course of 
business. Next, Section II illustrates the dangers associated with violating the automatic stay. 
Section III explains the trustee’s power to avoid or recover post-petition transfers made within 
the gap period. Last, Section IV asserts that contracts remain effective after the filing of an 
involuntary petition and, in certain scenarios, have the ability to negate otherwise valid gap 
period claims.  
I. A Gap Period Claim Is Not Appropriate When Debt Did Not Arise In The Ordinary Course 
Of Business  
 
 Pursuant to § 502(f), a gap period claim is only allowed if the “claim aros[e] in the 
ordinary course of the debtor’s business or financial affairs . . . .”7 The definition of ordinary 
course is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.8 In evaluating what is deemed the ordinary course, 
courts apply both a subjective and an objective test.  First, the courts look to the prior practices of 
the parties. Second, courts look to the standards of the relevant industry.9 The reason prior 
engagements are considered in the courts’ analysis is because they uncover the parties’ standard 
behavior when “debtors are healthy,” when business is normal or ordinary.10 If debt arises due to 
                                                
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(f); see also 11 U.S.C. § 507(c) (listing gap period claims third in line for repayment, behind 
only domestic dispute claims and administrative claims). 
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(f) (describing the characteristics of a valid gap period claim). 
7 11 U.S.C. § 502(f).   
8 See In re Meredith Hoffman Partners, 12 F.3d 1549 (10th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that “[t]he Code does not 
define ‘ordinary business’”). 
9 See generally In re Carled, Inc., 91 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 1996). 
10 In re Meredith Hoffman Partners, 12 F.3d 1549, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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a normal practice that the parties engaged in prior to the looming bankruptcy proceeding—when 
the debtors were “healthy”—a court is likely to find that the debt arose in the ordinary course of 
business.11  
 Debt that results solely because of an impending bankruptcy proceeding fails the ordinary 
course test.12 Courts will not allow a creditor to take advantage of the fact that § 507(f) of the 
code allocates gap period claims third priority status.13 For example, courts will deny a claim if a 
creditor engages in a strategic, extraordinary transaction to attain a prioritized gap period claim.14 
In other words, courts will not deem debt as ordinary course debt if the claim was produced by 
an “obvious extra-ordinary transaction . . . designed to give” one creditor “an advantage over 
other creditors . . . .”15  
II. Section 303(f) Does Not Absolve Creditors From Violations Of The Automatic Stay 
 
 Pursuant to § 362 of the bankruptcy code, the filing of a petition, voluntary or 
involuntary, operates as a stay.16 Although § 303 allows an “involuntary debtor [to] operate its 
business . . . the debtor may not waive the protections afforded to the property of the estate by 
the automatic stay.”17 The debtor may not allow a creditor to take action against the estate’s 
property.18  
                                                
11 See generally In re Advanced Elecs., Inc., 107 B.R. 503 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that, after the filing of 
an involuntary petition, employees working to “resume normal business operations and relations” asserted a valid 
gap period claim); In re CSVA, Inc., 140 B.R. 116 (Bankr. W.D.N.C 1992) (holding that monthly rent payments, 
collected before and after the filing of an involuntary petition, arose in the ordinary course of business).  
12 See In re Manufacturer’s Supply Co. Inc., 132 Bankr. 127, 129 (Bankr. N.C. Ohio 1991) (legal fees resulting 
solely because of bankruptcy filings are not debts arising in the ordinary course of debtor’s business). 
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(c). 
14 See In re Monarch Capital Corp., 163 B.R. 899, 905 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (“A claim arising from a strategic 
payment arrangement in lieu of a bankruptcy filing hardly arises in the ordinary course of a debtor’s business.”). 
15 See In re Colonial Discount Corp., 807 F.2d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 1986). 
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); see also In re Signature Apparel Grp., 577 B.R. 54, at 87 (“The automatic stay comes into 
effect instantly when an involuntary petition is filed.”). 
17 In re Signature Apparel Grp., 577 B.R. at 87 (citing In re E.D. Wilkins Grain Co., 235 B.R 647, 650 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ca. 1999)). 
18 See id. 
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 This scenario is demonstrated in In re Omni Graphics, Inc.19 There, after the filing of an 
involuntary petition, a creditor sold off the debtor’s assets in an attempt to reclaim debt.20 The 
Court held that the creditor’s “action in moving forward with the public sale . . . violated § 
362(a)(3).”21 More importantly, the Court alluded to the fact that, had the debtor initiated the sale 
with the intent to carry on its business operations instead of the creditor, § 303(f) would have 
applied and the Court would have likely rendered the sale acceptable.22  
 In summation, “[s]ection 303(f) of the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to absolve a 
creditor from liability for violating the automatic stay where it takes action against property of 
the estate . . . .”23 If a court deems that a creditor violated the automatic stay, among other 
punishments, it may: (1) void all transactions that violated the stay, (2) award costs and 
attorney’s fees for each violation, and, (3) where the violation is willful, award punitive 
damages.24  
III. Any Payment By A Debtor To A Creditor During The Gap Period Is Avoidable Unless The 
Debtor Receives Value In Exchange  
 
 A payment to a creditor during the gap period does not insulate a creditor from a trustee 
or debtor-in-possession’s strong arm powers. Under § 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee may 
“avoid a transfer of property of the estate” that occurs after the filing of a petition.25 The 
avoidance powers under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code apply equally to involuntary and 
voluntary cases.26  
                                                
19 See generally 119 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990). 
20 See id. 
21 Id.  
22 See id. (“Here, the sale of the assets was conducted by the [creditor], not by the debtor, and in no manner enabled 
the debtor to carry on its business operations.”). 
23 In re Signature Apparel Grp., 577 B.R. at 87. 
24 In re Omni Graphics, Inc.,119 B.R. at 644. 
25 11 U.S.C § 549(a); see also In re Signature Apparel Grp., 577 B.R. at 86 (“[S]ection 549 is the exclusive remedy 
by which post-petition transfers of estate property may be avoided.” ). 
26 See 11 U.S.C. § 549. 
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 In regard to involuntary cases specifically, a trustee may avoid gap period transfers if the 
exchange or transaction does not confer value to the debtor.27 Courts determine “the extent of 
value given . . . from the ‘giver’s’ perspective.”28 For example, if an involuntary debtor made a 
payment during the gap period for rental space, that transaction is unavoidable because, although 
the debtor paid for the rental space, the debtor received value—the rental space—in exchange.29 
Conversely, if an involuntary debtor makes a payment to satisfy a debt, that payment is 
avoidable because the debtor is making a payment and receiving nothing in return.30 More 
directly, § 549(b) specifically excludes the “satisfaction . . . of debt that arose before the 
commencement of the case” from the list of “value” transfers.31  
IV. Contractual Provisions Remain Effective Throughout the Gap Period and May Negate a 
Gap Period Claim’s Potential Value  
 
 Contractual provisions remain effective throughout the gap period.32 A party that neglects 
a contract due to the filing of an involuntary petition risks a potential breach.33 Courts have held 
that to effectively terminate a contract “it must be terminated in accordance with its express 
terms.”34 For example, in In re Signature Apparel Grp., the relevant contract required that a 
party send notice to effect termination.35 Instead, the defendant argued that the filing of the 
involuntary petition and the debtor’s subsequent behavior constituted repudiation or 
abandonment of the contract.36 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York 
disagreed and ruled that the defendant acted improperly during the gap period when the 
                                                
27 See 11 U.S.C. § 549(b). 
28 In re Oakwood Mkts., 203 F.3d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 2000). 
29 See id. at 410. 
30 Id. at 409.   
31 11 U.S.C. § 549(b). 
32 See generally In re Whistler Energy II, LLC, 571 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2017). 
33 See In re Signature Apparel Grp., 577 B.R. 54, 111 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2017) (concluding that defendant should 
have ensured that debtor’s rights under the contract were preserved during the gap period). 
34 Id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
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defendant “treated [a] Signature Licensing Agreement as terminated . . . .”37 An involuntary 
petition on its own will not terminate a contract. 
 In certain scenarios, contract provisions themselves may eliminate the right to a gap 
period claim.  For example, in In re Whistler Energy II, LLC a force majeure clause prevented 
the accrual of a claim.38 A force majeure clause is a clause that limits liability when an 
uncontrollable occurrence prohibits performance. In Whistler, a force majeure event, which 
resulted in a zero-dollar per day payment rate, persisted throughout the entire gap period.39 This 
led the Court to determine that the creditor’s gap period claim was effectively null and void.40 
Here, it is important to note that the Court did not invalidate the gap period claim, but concluded 
that the claim lacked any value because the force majeure clause made the relevant payment 
required by the contract zero dollars.41  
Conclusion 
 
 There are many difficulties a creditor must traverse to ensure repayment of a gap period 
claim. Reclamation of a gap period claim is not as straightforward as it appears to be. Creditors 
should thoroughly analyze an involuntary debtor’s situation before deciding to engage in 
business with it.  
 
                                                
37 Id. at 112.   
38 See 571 B.R. at 201. 
39 See id. 
40 See In re Whistler Energy II, LLC, 571 B.R at 206. 
41 Id. 
